support the implications of these general principles of equality. They have often strongly opposed implementing that general principle, such as busing or affirmative action, leading to what Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo (1985) have called the "principle-implementation gap." Similarly, black political candidates still seem to have unusual difficulty in attracting white support, despite some greater success in recent years. This seemingly paradoxical combination-widespread acceptance of the idea of racial equality mixed with continued resistance to change-is our starting point.
Is It Racism?
One possible explanation for this paradox is that racism did not disappear as a political force with the demise of Jim Crow. Rather, some political observers contend that racism continues to motivate much of the considerable white opposition to racial policies and black candidates, as in Edsall and Edsall's (1991) assertion that "when the official subject is presidential politics, taxes, welfare, crime, rights, or values . . . the real subject is race" (also see Edsall and Edsall 1992; Greenberg 1995) . By contrast, conservatives tout "the end of racism" (D'Souza 1995; also see Roth 1994) .
This controversy is mirrored in academic research, with some finding a continuing role of racism. Negative racial stereotypes have not disappeared (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Devine and Elliot 1995; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Sniderman and Piazza 1993) . Whites have been found to be significantly more opposed to racially targeted policies than to analogous policies targeted for the poor of all races (Bobo and Kluegel 1993) . Racial attitudes have been shown to have substantial effects on whites' opposition to busing, affirmative action, or welfare spending, and support for law and order or tax-reduction policies (Gilens 1995; Kinder and Sanders 1996; McConahay 1982; Sears and Citrin 1985; Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979; Sears et al. 1980; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996) . Similar analyses have found a significant role of racial attitudes in whites' opposition to black candidates for mayor in large cities (Kinder and Sears 1981; Pettigrew 1972; Sears and Kinder 1971) , or Jesse Jackson's presidential candidacy (Abramowitz 1994; Sears, Citrin, and Kosterman 1987) . There also is evidence that racism has played a role in campaigns in which white candidates have been accused of playing the "race card," such as those of David Duke (Kuzenski, Bullock, and Gaddie 1995) or George Bush (Kinder and Sanders 1996) .
But others have been more skeptical about the continuing importance of racism. For example, Sniderman and Piazza (1993, p. 107) believe that "the central problem of racial politics is not the problem of prejudice," and that it no longer dominates whites' preferences about racial policies. Hagen (1995) reports a sharp decline in white Americans' mentioning race as one of America's most important problems, or as an explanation for their candidate or party preferences. Others note that opposition to race-targeted policies may lie instead in seemingly race-neutral attitudes, such as ideological conservatism (Sniderman and Piazza 1993) , opposition to the welfare state (Abramowitz 1994) , skepticism about failed liberal policies (Roth 1994) , or more general attitudes about individualism (Carmines and Merriman 1993) , equality (Miller and Shanks 1996) , or partisan interest groups (Miller 1994) . As a result, some argue that racial attitudes have little residual independent effect when nonracial attitudes are controlled for.
Our own general perspective is that of symbolic politics theory. This theory assumes that socialization leaves individuals with strong, longstanding attitudinal predispositions, which can be evoked by appropriate political symbols (Sears 1993) . We assume that for several centuries white Americans have grown up in a socializing culture marked by widespread negative attitudes toward African Americans, a socializing culture that seems unlikely to have been abruptly overturned within the relatively few years since the end of Jim Crow. Presenting whites with racially targeted policies or black candidates should evoke that common antiblack element.
Our first empirical goal is to provide some systematic data on how strong a role racism does play in white Americans' contemporary racial policy and candidate preferences. We attack this in four ways. Our primary analytic strategy is straightforward and reasonably standard: regressing policy attitudes on indicators of racism, imposing controls on the other plausible causal factors, especially ostensibly nonracial attitudes (such as party identification, ideology, social welfare attitudes, and traditional social values) and demographic variables. We proceed from that point with three further strategies. First, we test the contention (Sniderman and Piazza 1993) that each racial policy issue elicits a different set of underlying attitudes and values appropriate to its unique content, rather than all tapping into a common substrate of racism. Second, we go beyond policy issues to test the effects of racial attitudes on whites' evaluations of black candidates and of fringe white candidates with a reputation for ethnocentrism. Third, we test whether or not higher education blocks the impact of racism. It has long been established that educational level is positively correlated with racial tolerance (see, e.g., Campbell 1971; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985) . But does higher education, by teaching racial tolerance, also reduce the power of racial prejudices over policy and candidate preferences? Sniderman and Piazza (1993) argue that it should, and that higher education, by enlarging political sophistication, should instead enable individuals better to connect their own nonracial ideologies and values cognitively to ongoing policy debates. So higher education should reduce the power of racism and increase that of ideology. The symbolic politics perspective, in contrast, assumes that more education should increase the consistency of policy preferences with almost any long-standing predisposition, whether racial or nonracial (Sears 1993) .' Available data concerning higher education as a moderator of the effects of racial antagonism are somewhat mixed (see Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Sniderman and Piazza 1993, pp. 117-26) , so we examine whether or not higher education mitigates the power of racial antagonism over whites' racial policy preferences in favor of nonracial predispositions.
In pursuing these empirical goals, we by no means intend to suggest that racism is the only factor involved, or indeed that any single factor represents the whole story. But in view of the controversy over the role of racism, it seems to us important to provide a rigorous and focused test of its effects.
Forms of Racism in American Politics
Our second goal is to determine the most politically influential form of racism today. Our view is that each historical discontinuity described at the outset has significantly altered how ordinary citizens think about race in politics and so has changed the nature of racism in mass politics. Others might say that any racially based component of white resistance to change simply reflects familiar traditional prejudices or ethnocentrism that will always be with us (see, e.g., Sniderman and Piazza 1993) .
On this point, it is important to be clear about how we are defining "racism." Dictionaries commonly offer two definitions: the classic theory of biologically based racial superiority (e.g., "a belief that race is the primary determinant of human traits and capacities and that racial differences produce an inherent superiority of a particular race") and the more general "racial prejudice or discrimination" (see Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary [1989] , p. 969). To avoid artificially narrowing the search for the most politically potent form of contemporary racism, we employ this second, more general definition. This describes a categorybased affective response to attitude objects that have to do with race, in which racism is inferred if an individual responds systematically more negatively to attitude objects associated with blacks than to other comparable attitude objects (just as anti-Semitism is inferred when attitude objects associated with Jews are responded to especially negatively).
The contemporary empirical literature has distinguished five different ways of conceptualizing and operationalizing racial attitudes, all of which we will employ in our empirical comparisons.
1. The old-fashioned racism of Jim Crow days focused on the theory of biological superiority of the white race, and on the physical segregation of and legalized discrimination against African Americans. It has been variously referred to as "old-fashioned racism," "redneck racism" (McConahay 1986; McConahay and Hough 1976) , "blatant racism" (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), or "classical racism" (Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996). 2. Stereotypes of blacks as lazy, unintelligent, morally depraved, violent, loud, and ostentatious have long been common in American society (Devine and Elliot 1995; Katz and Braly 1933) . Some of these traits invoke the theory of black genetic inferiority (which is also at the heart of old-fashioned racism), while others are widely assumed to be more culturally based. Both have frequently been used in survey studies of racial attitudes as predictors of policy and candidate preferences (see Bobo and Kluegel1993; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Tuch and Hughes 1996) .
3. Negative affect toward African Americans as a group has been measured most commonly with the National Election Studies (NES) "feeling thermometer" (Carmines and Merriman 1993; Sears 1988; Sears and Jessor 1996; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Tuch and Hughes 1996) . This is usually treated as the simplest and most purely affective index of racial prejudice.
4. Old-fashioned racism, stereotypes, and negative affect have been familiar features of the racial landscape throughout the twentieth century. However, evidence of continuing white resistance to change in an era that has generally renounced both biological theories of racial superiority and legalized racial inequality has generated a variety of descriptions of a "new racism." All share a component of negative attitudes toward African Americans; they differ in what is involved beyond that, and how they are measured. One family of concepts using very similar measurement include "symbolic racism" (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears and Kinder 197 l) , "modern racism" (McConahay 1986), "subtle racism" (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995) , and "racial resentments" (Kinder and Sanders 1996) . Other "new racisms," conceptualized and measured in other ways, include "ambivalent racism" (Katz, Wackenhut, and Hass 1986) , "aversive racism" (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986) , and "laissez-faire racism" (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997) .
Not everyone is persuaded that the notion of a "new" racism is required. Some say that the old racism is still quite common, and that the supposed decline in negative stereotyping has been exaggerated (Devine and Elliot 1995; Sniderman and Piazza 1993) . Others say that any "new" racism is at bottom not very different from an "old" racial prejudice (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985) , ethnocentrism (Sniderman and Piazza 1993) , or authoritarianism (Raden 1994) . Still others say that a "new" racism may only look new because it merely confounds an underlying "old" racism with political conservatism (Fazio et al. 1995; Roth 1994; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986; Weigel and Howes 1985) . We will return to these points below.
5. Finally, group position theory (Bobo and Hutchings 1996) , realistic group conflict theory (Bobo 1988) , social dominance theory (Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996) , and social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) share the assumption that attachment to a hegemonic in-group is a key factor. According to this perspective, the underlying psychological motive is to protect a hegemonic in-group's privileged position and suppress less powerful groups that aspire to equality. The exact content of the myths or ideologies that promote that goal may be mostly opportunistic, if not epiphenomenal, but presumably normally includes attachment to the in-group.' Operationally, positive affect toward whites as a group has most commonly (but minimally) been indexed with an NES feeling thermometer (Jessor 1988; Sears and Jessor 1996) .
Symbolic Racism
Our view is that the distinctions among these five forms of racial attitudes are important, both to capture the essence of racism in today's mass politics, and for more fundamental psychological reasons. The symbolic politics argument would suggest that all four forms of antiblack racism draw in part on the residues of a common negative socialization about African Americans. But in addition to that, the content of political debate varies from era to era. To trigger the most potent available predispositions requires a political stimulus that is appropriate to the era in question. The older forms of antiblack antagonism draw on the wellsprings of underlying racial prejudice, but the content and form of contemporary racial resentments have changed markedly. Old-fashioned racism has disappeared as an effective political force, replaced by a societal consensus on general egalitarian principles; few want to go back to the old days of formal segregation and formal discrimination (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985) . Negative racial affect and stereotypes are essential components of contemporary racism, but only part of the story.
We argue that as a political force, symbolic racism has largely displaced the older forms of racial attitude. Symbolic racism can be conceptualized in three ways.3 First, it is described as "symbolic" because it is phrased 2. These theories note that even if the exact content is epiphenomenal, it could nevertheless be quite consequential in practical terms. A myth that supports slavery could lead to more negative consequences for the subordinate group than one that merely supports meritocracy. 3. Here we do not attempt to develop any substantial distinction between symbolic racism and "modem racism" (McConahay 1982) , "subtle racism" (Pettigrew and Meertens in terms that are abstract and ideological; because it reflects whites' moral codes about how society should be organized rather than instrumental beliefs satisfying their own interests; and because it focuses on blacks as a group rather than on individual blacks (Sears and Kinder 1971) . Second, its cognitive content, as developed in earlier research, focuses explicitly on blacks in particular and includes the beliefs that racial discrimination is largely a thing of the past, that blacks should just work harder to overcome their disadvantages, and that blacks are making excessive demands for special treatment and get too much attention from elites, so their gains are often undeserved (Sears 1988) . Third, its attitudinal origins are hypothesized to lie in a blend of antiblack affect with the perception that blacks violate such traditional American values as the work ethic, traditional morality, and respect for traditional authority (Kinder and Sears 1981) .
Symbolic racism and the three older indicators of antiblack racism focus only on whites' derogation of the out-group. Does racism not also focus on attachment to the in-group? A symbolic politics theory would not assume that cultural socialization necessarily need embody both. To be sure, a culture may sometimes socialize both intense pride in the ingroup, as in the Nazis' celebration of "the Aryan race," and intense derogation of the out-group, as in their vigorous anti-Semitism. But the two elements need not be highly correlated; indeed, they may often be socialized quite independently of each other. We would argue that the conventional socialization of American whites has inculcated negative attitudes toward African Americans without much explicit focus on whiteness or celebration of it. American white supremacy movements are still quite small and on the political fringe. So we would expect animosity toward blacks to play a major role in the politics of race, but attitudes toward whites to be quite peripheral.
The symbolic racism perspective has two empirical implications, then. First, it argues in favor of taking seriously the differences across types of racism, rather than assuming they are all merely different indicators of a common underlying racial antagonism. Indeed, there is persuasive evidence that the underlying factorial structure of these racial attitudes yields at least two correlated factors, old-fashioned and symbolic r a~i s m .~ Second, it would argue that symbolic racism should have strong political effects, while these older forms of racial antagonism are likely to have rather weak ones. There have been few rigorous comparisons between types of racism in previous research, but when assessed individually the 1995), or "racial resentments" (Kinder and Sanders 1996) , all of which are measured in similar fashion. 4. For general population samples, see McConahay 1986; and Pettigrew and Meertens 1995;  for student samples, see Devine and Elliot 1995; Kleinpenning and Hagendoom 1993; Monteith 1996; and Swim et al. 1995. older forms generally have not had very strong effects. These weak effects do not necessarily mean that racism is a weak force in American politics; they may just reflect looking in the wrong place for its effects, and so underestimating its effects on whites' political thinking.
We here repeat these assessments of the effects of older forms of racism, but adding an explicit comparison to symbolic racism, expecting that it resonates better with whites' contemporary political resentments of blacks. In doing so we also specifically respond to several prior critiques of research on symbolic racism (e.g., Colleau et al. 1990; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986 ): that we do not distinguish sharply between measures of old-fashioned racism and symbolic racism, that symbolic racism is not internally homogeneous, that it is confounded with authoritarianism or nonracial conservatism, and that mere content overlap between measures of symbolic racism and those of racial policy preferences largely explain any link between the two.
Goals and Hypotheses
The two major goals of this article, then, are to provide convincing data on the effects of racism on racial policy and candidate preferences, and on which form of racism is most central. It hopes to be more convincing than past research by providing extensive replication of the same basic test, using as independent variables (1) several different indicators of racism in each survey and (2) statistical controls on a comprehensive roster of the other usual suspects; as dependent variables (3) the full range of racial policies in debate today, including guarantees of equal opportunity, special aid to blacks, and affirmative action for blacks, and (4) a range of political candidates, including blacks, white liberals, and white conservatives; and as databases ( 5 ) four different surveys, conducted by three different survey houses for quite different purposes.
Our reasoning yields several hypotheses. Following from the assumptions that African Americans are a potent political symbol and that the overriding symbolism of racially targeted policies concerns race, (1) racial attitudes should be the single most important determinant of whites' opposition to racial policies, while ostensibly race-neutral predispositions should have minor effects. Concerning the various forms of racism, (2) symbolic racism should have stronger political effects than the older forms of racism; (3) the origins of symbolic racism should lie in both antiblack affect and such nonracial attitudes as ideology and traditional social values, but (4) symbolic racism should nevertheless have substantial independent effect above and beyond these antecedents. The generality of a role of racism should be demonstrated if (5) whites' responses to racial policies have a strong racial basis regardless of policy content; (6) racial attitudes have significant independent effects on whites' evaluations of black candidates and of fringe white candidates with a reputation for ethnocentrism, but evaluations of mainstream white candidates are overshadowed by nonracial partisan attitudes; (7) racial attitudes dominate nonracial attitudes in explaining even college-educated whites' racial policy preferences.
Method
This study uses four surveys: the 1986 (N = 2,176) and 1992 (N = 2,110) National Election Studies (NES), focused on the 1986 congressional and 1992 presidential elections; the 1994 General Social Survey (GSS; N = 2,992), focused principally on time-series measurement of sociological indicators; and the 1995 Los Angeles County Social Survey (LACSS; N = 5 9 3 , focused on the politics of intergroup relations. These four surveys were chosen because they each contain measures of symbolic racism as well as measures of one or more other kinds of racial attitudes. The NES and GSS studies are based on large representative cross-sectional samples of American adults. The LACSS is a random digit dialing telephone survey conducted annually in Los Angeles County. For the analyses in all four surveys only white respondents were i n~l u d e d .~
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Separate scales were developed for each of three areas of racial policy, which we describe as "equal opportunity," "federal assistance," and "affirmative a~t i o n . "Perceived obligation of the federal government to guarantee equal opportunity used (1) government assurance of fair treatment in jobs, (2) government-guaranteed school integration, and (3) government-guaranteed equal opportunity.' All three items were used in 1986, and the first two in 1992. Scale reliabilities (alpha) were .68 in 5. White respondents made up 83 percent of the respondents in the 1986 NES, 85 percent in the 1992 NES, 79 percent in the 1994 GSS, and 44 percent in the 1995 LACSS. The 1986 NES and 1994 GSS used split-form designs with two independent samples; in each case only one was employed in the analyses since it contained most of the racial variables. 6. This follows the procedure used in several earlier studies (see Jessor 1988; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears and Kosterman 1991) and parallels Sniderman and Piazza's (1993) "fair treatment," "social welfare," and "race-conscious" racial agendas. 7. The specific wordings were (1) "Should the government in Washington see to it that black people get fair treatment in jobs or is this not the federal government's business?" (2) "Do you think the government in Washington should see to it that white and black children go to the same schools, or stay out of this area as it is not the government's business?" and (3) "Equal opportunity for blacks and whites to succeed is important but it's not really the government's job to guarantee it." 1986 and . 56 in 1992 . Preferences regarding the role of the government in delivering federal assistance to blacks were measured with (1) increased or decreased federal spending on programs benefiting blacks (1986 NES, 1994 , and (2) the question, Should the government help blacks (and other minority groups) or should they help themselves (1986 and 1992 NES)? Alpha reliabilities were .60 in the 1986 NES and .68 in the 1992 NES. Affirmative action scales on extending special preferences to blacks in employment and education were available in all four surveys: (1) preferential hiring and promotion of blacks (two items in 1994 GSS, and one each in the 1986 NES, 1992 NES, and 1995 LACSS); (2) quotas for admitting black students in universities (1986 NES, 1994 ; (3) special treatment for blacks (1986 NES, 1994 ; (4) set-asides for black contractors (1995 LACSS). Alpha reliabilities were .74 (1986 NES), .73 (1992 NES), .67 (1994 GSS), and .61 (1995 .
Candidate evaluations were measured in the NES studies on a "feeling thermometer," where 0 is cold and 100 is warm. In 1986, the candidates were Ronald Reagan and Jesse Jackson; in 1992, the candidates were Jackson, Bill Clinton, George Bush, and Pat Buchanan. The appendix gives the original item numbers or acronyms.
SYMBOLIC RACISM
We rely on the measures of symbolic racism used most often in previous studies. All items refer explicitly to "blacks" (except in one case, to "civil rights leaders") as well as incorporating one of the following standard themes.
Denial of continuing racial discrimination.
(1) Has there been a lot of real change in the position of black people in the past few years? (1986 and 1992 NES) . (2) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class (1986 and 1992 NES) .
Absence of positive emotions toward blacks. (3) How often have you felt sympathy for blacks? (4) How often have you felt admiration for blacks? (both in the 1994 GSS, drawn from Pettigrew and Meertens's [I9951 "subtle racism" scale).
Blacks should work harder. (5) If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites (1986 and 1992 NES) . (6) Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without special favors (all surveys). (7) Most blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if they tried (1986 NES).
Excessive demands. (8) Are civil rights leaders trying to push too fast, going too slowly, or are they moving at about the right speed? (1986 and 1992 NES) . (9) Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights (1995 LACSS). Undeserved advantage. (10) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve (1986 and 1992 NES) . (1 1) Do blacks get much more attention from the government than they deserve, more attention, about the right amount, less attention, or much less attention from the government than they deserve? 1995 LACSS) . (12) Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black person than from a white person (1986 NES). Items 1-4, 10, and 12 were reverse-keyed. Alpha reliabilities were .78 (1986 NES, eight items), .76 (1992 NES, six items), .65 (1994 GSS, four items), and .69 (1995 LACSS, three items).
OTHER RACIAL ATTITUDES
Racial affect toward "blacks" (1986 and 1992 NES) and "whites" (1992 NES) were measured with the "feeling thermometer" cited above. The stereotype items involved ratings of blacks and whites on three 7-point scales whose endpoints were "hard-workingllazy, " "violentlpeaceful," and "unintelligentlintelligent" (1992 NES, 1995 LACSS; 1994 GSS, "hard-workingllazy" only) . Scales were computed from the differences between ratings of blacks and whites, to control for individual differences in the use of the scale. Alpha reliabilities were .74 (1992 NES) and .69 (1995 LACSS).
Old-fashioned racism was distinguished from symbolic racism both theoretically and empirically, according to factor analyses described later. In the 1986 NES only: (1) the races are different due to a divine plan, and (2) blacks come from a less able race. In the 1994 GSS only: (3) laws against marriages between blacks and whites; (4) blacks shouldn't push themselves where they are not wanted; (5) white people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods; (6) objections to sending your children to a school where half of the children are black; (7) voting for a black president; (8) blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing because they have less inborn ability to learn. Alpha reliabilities were .54 (1986 NES) and .71 (1994 GSS) .
NONRACIAL PARTISANSHIP A N D VALUES
Party identification was measured with the standard 7-point summary variable running from "strong Democrat" to "strong Republican," combined, in the 1986 and 1992 NES only, with the difference score between the thermometer ratings of the two parties. Alpha reliabilities were .84 (1986 NES) and .85 (1992 NES) . In the 1992 NES, 1994 GSS, and 1995 LACSS political ideology was measured with the standard 7-point summary variable running from "strong liberal" to "strong conservati~e."~ In 1992 the difference between the thermometer ratings of conservatives and liberals was also included (alpha reliability was .SO); in 1986, only the thermometer difference score was used because the standard self-rating was not asked of the split sample asked the racial items. Social welfare policy items (which did not mention blacks) were drawn from previous studies (Abramowitz 1994; Miller 1993 Miller , 1994 Miller and Shanks 1996) : (1) fewer versus more services and spending, (2) government-guaranteed jobs, and (3) government-guaranteed health in~urance.~ Alpha reliabilities were .36 (1986 NES, first two items only) and .63 (1992 NES, all three items). Appropriate measurement was not available in the GSS or LACSS.
Nonracial values were also indexed with items that did not explicitly mention blacks. Individualism scales were developed from the 1986 NES and 1995 LACSS with items focused on the Protestant work ethic and on the role of effort in success, yielding alpha reliabilities of .60 (six items) and .43 (two items), respectively. The 1994 GSS measure of individualism consisted of one item: getting ahead through hard work. Morality/sexuality scales focused on the tolerance of different lifestyles, the breakdown of moral standards, premarital sex, sexual education, and so on. Alpha reliabilities were .81 (1986 NES, eight items), .69 (1992 NES, five items), .65 (1994 GSS, seven items), and .72 (1995 LACSS, two items). Authoritarianism was measured in the 1992 NES with four items on child-rearing values: (1) independence or respect for elders, (2) obedience or self-reliance, (3) curiosity or good manners, and (4) being considerate or well behaved. The 1994 GSS used: (1) necessary to discipline child with spanking, (2) obedience and respect for authority as virtues children should learn, and (3) the value of a child's learning "to obey," and (4) obedience or thinking for self more important. The 1995 LACSS repeated the first two GSS items. Alpha reliabilities were .66 (1992 NES, four items), .67 (1994 GSS, four items), and .48 (1995 LACSS, two items).
The regression equations also included controls for the four demographic variables that are usually most highly correlated with white Americans' racial attitudes: age, gender, and education, and in the national surveys, a dummy variable for respondents' region of residence (South vs. non-South).
8. In 1992, a follow-up question for those who refused initial response did induce some to respond, but including them actually reduced scale reliability, so they were excluded. 9. These other studies also used, variously, items on government spending to help blacks, the poor, or the homeless, and on food stamps and research for AIDS. We selected the more general items as more appropriate for measuring the general predisposition, and as best measuring domestic policy spending preferences independent of any racial content. 
The Role of Racism
Is racism the most powerful contributor to whites' racial policy attitudes, as hypothesis 1 suggests? To test this, we present nine analyses that regress racial attitudes, partisanship, and nonracial values (along with relevant demographic controls) on attitudes toward policies providing blacks with equal opportunity (table I), federal assistance (table 2) , and affinnative action (table 3) . We present both the bivariate correlations (in parentheses) and the standardized regression coefficients, so we can compare the simple association of each predictor with policy attitudes against its power with all other predictors controlled.
It is clear that racial attitudes have consistent and powerful effects. Antiblack racial attitudes have an average correlation of .31 with these policy preferences. But nonracial predispositions have consistently When we turn to the regression analyses, however, it becomes clear that racial attitudes consistently dominate. In every case, the strongest single predictor of these policy preferences is a racial attitude. All nine regression coefficients for symbolic racism are significant, averaging .39, and all six terms for antiblack affect are significant as well. The relationships of nonracial attitudes with these policy preferences are much reduced with racial attitudes considered. The strongest remaining nonracial effect is that of social welfare attitudes, yielding a mean regression coefficient of .16 (with five out of six terms significant). But the other nonracial predictors have little residual effect: the average regression coefficient for ideology is .03 (only three of nine significant); for party identification, .06; for individualism, .02; for morality, .04; and for authoritarianism, -.02. In short, in multivariate analyses, racial attitudes erase most of the original bivariate effects of nonracial predispositions.
A convenient way to summarize these effects is shown in table 4. To start with, the racial attitudes were entered as the first stage of a threestage regression analysis, the demographics were entered as the second stage, and the nonracial attitudes were entered as the third stage. In a parallel analysis, the nonracial attitudes were entered first, demographics second, and the racial attitudes last. The racial attitudes, when entered first, account for substantially more variance (25 percent, on average; see table 4, col. 1) than do the nonracial attitudes (14 percent; col. 2). When entered last, the racial attitudes continue to add considerable incremental variance (15 percent, on average; col. 3), whereas the nonracial attitudes add rather little (5 percent; col. 4). In short, racial attitudes are consistently more powerful predictors of these racial policy preferences than are nonracial attitudes. lo
Which Form of Racism?
Hypothesis 2 suggested that symbolic racism would prove the strongest of the racial attitudes. And it does, quite handily. It has by far the strongest bivariate correlation with policy preferences, averaging .48 across the nine tests shown in tables 1-3. The average correlations for the other racial attitudes are lower: antiblack affect, r = .27; antiblack stereotypes, r = .23; and old-fashioned racism, r = .16. In the regression analyses, the strength of symbolic racism emerges still more clearly. In all nine cases NOTE.-All data are percentages. Entries in columns 1 and 2 are the r-square for racial or nonracial attitudes considered alone; in column 3, thc changes in r-square when racial attitudes are added as a final stage after demographics and nonracial attitudes are considered; in column 4, the change when nonracial attitudes are entered in the last stage; and in column 5, the increment in r-square when symbolic racism is added as a final stage after all other variables have been considered. The r-square for all variables shown in column 6 is not adjusted for the number of variables in each equation. For the adjusted r-squares, see tables 1-3. its effects are at least double the size of any other, with an average coefficient of .39. Antiblack affect also has significant effects in every case, though substantially weaker, averaging .13.Stereotypes and old-fashioned racism have virtually no residual effect, with significant effects in only two of 12 cases (and average coefficients of only .04 and -.01, respectively). All racial attitudes are not alike; symbolic racism has consistently more political power than do antiblack affect, stereotypes, or old-fashioned racism."
What about pro-white solidarity? Hypothesis 2 suggests that animosity toward blacks should play the central role in the politics of race, while attitudes toward whites should be peripheral. This study does not claim to offer a thorough test of this hypothesis. But the evidence we have suggests that white affect is not a key factor. Tables 1-3 show that the "white thermometer," included in the 1992 NES, was essentially unrelated to whites' racial policy preferences, with a mean bivariate correlation of .Ol, and a mean regression coefficient of .OO. These data suggest that animosity toward blacks has a great deal, and defense of the white in-group has rather little, to do with whites' racial policy preferences.
CONTENT OVERLAP
The hypothesis that symbolic racism is a different and politically more powerful form of racism has attracted some criticism. One concern is that the indicators of symbolic racism themselves have too much conceptual overlap with the dependent variables in these analyses. If symbolic racism is merely a measure of opposition to the contemporary civil rights agenda concerning special, race-conscious government aid to blacks in the abstract, and the racial policy scales measure opposition to it in concrete form, any association between them might reflect nothing more than that common content.
To check on this possibility, the basic analyses shown in tables 1-3 were repeated on the 1986 and 1992 NES data after purging the symbolic racism scales of all items alluding to government (referring to "special favors," special attention from government, or dependency on govern-11. One concern might be that symbolic racism only has stronger effects than the other measures of racial attitudes because it is more reliable. However, the reliability coefficients were for the most part quite similar across racial attitudes: in 1992, the alpha coefficient for symbolic racism was .76, compared to .74 for the stereotypes; in 1994, .65 compared to .71 for old-fashioned racism; and in 1995, .69 compared to .69 for the stereotypes. The one exception is that in 1986, the alpha for symbolic racism was .71, compared to .54 for old-fashioned racism. In other cases, most notably antiblack and pro-white affect, the measures were based on single items, so no reliability estimates are available. These differences do not appear to be sufficiently large to account for the obtained differences in impact on policy preferences shown in tables 1-3. Ideally, we would have been able to use structural equation modeling techniques that correct for unreliability, but a number of our predictors were indexed by fewer than the minimum number of items. ment welfare payments), which would seem to be the most vulnerable to such conceptual overlap.12 The items that were retained did not allude to government at all, asking (1) whether there has been no real change for blacks, (2) whether generations of slavery and discrimination make it hard for blacks to work their way up, (3) whether blacks have gotten less than they deserve, (4) if blacks only tried harder they would be just as well off, and (5) civil rights people have been pushing too hard.
These scales of symbolic racism, purged of any reference to special government attention, had slightly lower reliabilities than did the originals (in 1986 , the reliability drops from .78 to .65; in 1992, from .76 to .70). However, their associations with the policy preference scales hardly change at all. The average symbolic racism regression coefficients drop only slightly, from .41 and .39 for the original scales, to .38 and .36 for the purged scales.13 These reductions are well within the bounds of what would be expected from the slightly lower scale reliabilities alone. Purging the symbolic racism scales of items that refer to government action does not alter the basic findings, so the central role of symbolic racism is not likely to be due merely to overlapping content of independent and dependent variables.14 THE ORIGINS O F SYMBOLIC RACISM Hypothesis 3 suggests that symbolic racism originates in a blend of antiblack affect with the perception that blacks violate traditional nonracial values, which we measure here with scales of individualism, morality, and authoritarianism. In two respects the data are quite consistent with this hypothesis. The overall model accounts for a considerable amount of variance, ranging from 34 percent to 37 percent across the four studies, as shown in table 5. This parallelism in r-square across the four studies is striking given the considerable differences in model specification, and 12. This was not possible in the GSS and LACSS because of the limited range of symbolic racism items available. 13. The mean bivariate correlations of the full symbolic racism scales with policy preferences were .52 and .49 in 1986 and 1992, respectively; the mean correlations for the purged scales were .49 and .47. 14. Two other critiques of previous research on symbolic racism are irrelevant to this study. In earlier studies we had developed omnibus measures of "racial intolerance" (or "racial prejudice") that incorporated elements of both old-fashioned racism and symbolic racism (Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979; Sears et al. 1980) . Although not intended to measure symbolic racism, or represented as such in those papers, these have sometimes been misinterpreted as measures of symbolic racism (see, e.g., Sniderman and Tetlock 1986) . In any case, here we maintain a strict distinction between the two forms of racism. In another early study we treated two policy preferences (toward busing and quotas) as subsets of symbolic racism (Kinder and Sears 1981) . While limited there to the prediction of voting behavior in a mayoralty race, and intended to make the point that such racial issues had become symbolic themselves, that treatment proved confusing, and in any case would plainly be inappropriate here in predicting racial policy preferences. in measurement of both the predictors and symbolic racism. Second, antiblack affect has consistent effects throughout (whether measured directly through the black thermometer, or indirectly through antiblack stereotypes). Its bivariate correlations average .28, and its regression coefficients are significant in each study. So the racial affect piece of the puzzle appears to be in place.
The other presumed component of symbolic racism, nonracial values, has in the past proven a more elusive target (see, e.g., Sears 1988) . The original formulations cited earlier alluded in rather general terms to several traditional values, with the door also left open to the possibility that conservative political ideology might collect some of the variance that had originated in one or more of these values. The data in table 5 are roughly consistent with these expectations, although it must be said that the expectations are rather general, and the fit quite variable across model specifications. The average bivariate correlation of traditional values with symbolic racism is .27, and six of the 10 regression coefficients are significant. The three partisanship predispositions yielded a similar average correlation (.26), with half of the ideology terms and both social welfare terms significant.
In sum, we can be confident that these variables together consistently explain a satisfactory amount of variance in symbolic racism, and that symbolic racism has substantial origins in antiblack affect as well as some mixture of conservative partisan attitudes and nonracial traditional values. But we cannot attempt to be very precise here about the nature of that contribution. A more thorough analysis of the origins of symbolic racism would exceed the bounds of this article.
A N EMERGENT FORM OF RACISM
We have seen that there is a strong direct effect of symbolic racism on racial policy preferences, with rather weak effects of other attitudes. We also have seen that symbolic racism has origins in both antiblack affect and a mixture of conservative nonracial attitudes and values. These two findings by themselves might be consistent with the critique cited earlier that symbolic racism is nothing but an older form of racial prejudice confounded with ideological conservatism. From that view we would expect that traditional prejudice and conservative ideology would have strong indirect effects on racial policy preferences, with symbolic racism simply serving as a convenient pass-through for these more fundamental attitudes, adding no explanatory power itself. Our view, in contrast, is that symbolic racism is a new and different form of racism, adding an independent note of its own. Accordingly, hypothesis 4 predicts that symbolic racism will have a substantial independent effect on racial policy prefer-ences, above and beyond whatever it mediates on behalf of ideology and traditional prejudices.
The key statistic is the variance explained by symbolic racism when entered in a hierarchical regression equation after all other variables have been considered. It should explain no additional variance if it only mediates the indirect effects of other variables. However, it proves to have a substantial effect quite independent of any of the other variables. The increment to r-square that it adds as the last stage in the equation averages 10.5 percent across these nine tests and in every test is highly significant. The data are shown in table 4 (col. 5). This consistently strong independent effect seems to us good evidence that symbolic racism is not merely a mediator of other conventional racial or nonracial attitudes, but that it represents a powerful and different form of white racial resentment.
The Generality of a Racial Response
Earlier we saw that racism is a dominant factor in whites' opposition to racially targeted policies. Next we take up three tests of the generality of those racially based responses.
DIVERSE RACIAL POLICY AREAS
Do whites respond similarly to quite different racial policies? Hypothesis 5 suggests that the common racial symbolism in these racial policies should dominate whites' responses to all of them, despite their unique features, indicating a central role of race. But if each policy issue were to be appraised quite independently, on its own merits, nonracial factors would seem to be more decisive (Sniderman and Piazza 1993) .
One approach to this question is to use factor analysis to determine whether or not whites' responses to all racial policies revolve around a single factor, presumably their common racial content. In contrast, a multiple-factor solution with uncorrelated factors would indicate that all these policies are evaluated on their own terms, irrespective of their common racial content. To begin with, we conducted exploratory (unconstrained) factor analyses on the two NES studies, using principal axis (principal factor) extraction with an oblique rotation. The 1986 data yielded two highly correlated (phi = .57) factors, accounting for 41.9 percent of the variance (table 6, cols. 1 and 2). The 1992 data yielded a single factor, accounting for 34.9 percent of the variance. Its loadings are also shown in table 6 (col. 3).15An alternative test uses confirmatory factor analyses, constrained to either single-factor or three-factor solutions. In both years the single-factor solution fits well, with all items loading on a single factor (in 1986 , the loadings ranged from .48 to .62; the results for 1992 are shown in table 6). Constraining the analysis to a three-factor solution, with an oblique rotation, does yield three factors in both years, but they are highly correlated (average phi = .52 and .53, respectively). In sum, the factor analytic evidence shows either a single factor on which all policy attitudes load, or a multiple-factor solution in which the obtained factors are very highly correlated. Either outcome suggests the power of the underlying racial basis of whites' responses to such policies.
Second, if whites are responding primarily to the common racial content of these policies, racial attitudes should play the strongest explanatory role in all three policy areas. They do. The standardized regression coefficients for symbolic racism average .38, .39, and .41 for the three issue areas (see tables 1 to 3, respectively). Antiblack affect has weaker and more variable effects, but it is statistically significant in all cases. The weaker roles of nonracial attitudes are also quite similar across areas. Political ideology yielded average coefficients of .08, .01, and .02; party identification, .02, .06, and .09; social welfare, .20, .22, and .05; and morality/sexuality, .06, .02, and .04, to mention those with sufficient cases to make an average meaningful.
Perhaps the best summary statistic is the relative contribution of racial and nonracial attitudes to variance explained in the three policy areas. In each policy area, racial attitudes explain more variance than do nonracial attitudes, regardless of the stage at which either is entered in the equation. In each area, the pooled racial attitudes contribute at least half again as much variance explained as do the pooled nonracial attitudes when entered at the first stage (cf. cols. 1 and 2 of table 4), and they contribute over twice as much variance as nonracial attitudes when each is entered as the last stage of the equation (cf. cols. 3 and 4 in table 4). The incremental effect of symbolic racism when added as the last stage of the regression is also very similar across policy areas, averaging 8.7 percent, 11.7 percent, and 10.6 percent in additional r-squared, respectively. The determinants of whites' racial policy attitudes are, therefore, very much the same across racial policy areas.
So the appropriate conclusion would seem to be that the racial content of these policies is the feature that captures much of whites' attention. There is little evidence of the kind of independence of white responses to the three policy areas hypothesized by Sniderman and Piazza (1993) . To be sure, each policy also has its own idiosyncratic features to which whites respond, and which account for any differences in the frequency of opposition to each policy.16 But this indeterminacy should not blind us to the powerful evidence for a central role of racial attitudes in forming these preferences.
CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS
This literature has been concerned with the evaluation of political candidates as well as with racial policies. Hypothesis 6 suggests that racial attitudes are likely to have clear independent effects on the evaluations of black candidates, or of white candidates who engage in explicitly ethnocentric appeals, but less effect on those of more mainstream white majorparty presidential candidates. To test this hypothesis, we examined evaluations of the most prominent candidates in the 1986 and 1992 National Election Studies (the 1994 GSS and 1995 LACSS had no items on candidates). The data are shown in table 7.
This hypothesis receives substantial support. First, consider evaluations of Jesse Jackson, the most visible black candidate. In 1986 and 1992, both symbolic racism and antiblack affect have significant effects, of about equal magnitude. So does nonracial partisanship. Symbolic racism also contributes significantly to support for Pat Buchanan, the closest in these data sets to an explicitly ethnocentrically oriented white candidate, but 16 . A thorough canvass of survey data on differences in white support across the three policy areas is beyond the scope of this article. not as much as do party identification and ideology. Racial attitudes have no systematic effect on evaluations of the more mainstream major-party white leaders, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. Only two of the nine relevant coefficients are significant in the expected direction (and two in the opposite direction). Their evaluations are much more influenced by party identification and ideology.17 Racial attitudes in general, and symbolic racism in particular, are triggered first and foremost by candidates with a manifest connection to African Americans.
THE ROLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Finally, a more refined version of the emphasis on nonracial conservatism assumes a moderating effect of education. According to Sniderman and Piazza (1993) , higher education, by teaching racial tolerance, should damp the political effects of racial prejudice and, by enlarging political sophistication, enhance one's ability to connect ongoing policy disputes to nonracial ideologies and values. In contrast, hypothesis 7, reflecting the symbolic politics perspective, assumes that more education will increase the consistency of policy preferences with any long-standing predispositions, and therefore racial attitudes should remain dominant even among the college-educated.
To test these hypotheses, we have split the samples into those with college degrees and those with no college (conforming to Sniderman and Piazza's [I9931 procedure^) .'^ In fact, symbolic racism had substantially stronger bivariate correlations with racial policy preferences among the college-educated (average r = .64) than it did among the less educated (average r = .44). The regression coefficients for symbolic racism tend to be somewhat higher among the better-educated, but the differences between education groups are not large and none is significant, as shown in table 8. Nor are the older and simpler forms of racial animosity more potent among those with no college education; neither the bivariate correlations nor the regression coefficients (see table 8) differ much across the 17. The role of any given attitude in the evaluations of contemporary major-party presidential nominees depends to a considerable extent on the exact model specification. Others find, as we do, that entering most available nonracial attitudes displaces the direct effects of racial attitudes (see Abrarnowitz 1994; Miller 1994; Miller and Shanks 1996 ; also see Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990) . However, that assumes they are causally prior to racial attitudes, which is inconsistent with much theory and evidence about the early origins of racial attitudes. Including only a minimal set of nonracial attitudes to adhere to this latter assumption yields substantially stronger effects of racial attitudes (Kinder and Sanders 1996) . It is difficult to see how any single cross-sectional study can resolve this dilemma to everyone's satisfaction. 18. We have used only the two NES surveys in these analyses. The LACSS had too few white respondents to allow for reliable estimates among the college graduates, as did the 1994 GSS, because of its complex split-sample design (fewer than 40 white college graduates remained with data on our key variables). two education groups.19 On balance there is no evidence of any systematically stronger impact of racism among the less educated than among the college-educated.
As predicted from both theoretical perspectives, education strengthens the bivariate correlations of ideology and the other partisan predispositions with policy preferences: the mean correlation of partisan attitudes with policy preferences is .47 among the college educated and .17 among the less educated. But there are no systematic differences between education groups in the regression coefficients, because of the strong effects of symbolic racism in both educational groups.'O The data support hypothesis 7 quite well, then. The ordering of predictive power among these various predispositions is quite parallel among college-educated and non-college-educated whites: symbolic racism in particular, and racial attitudes in general, are considerably stronger than are nonracial predispositions even among the college-educated. Moreover, all these predispositions together account considerably better for policy preferences among the college-educated: as table 8 shows, in each case the total r-squared is almost twice as high as it is for the less educated. There is no evidence that a college education leads to a replacement of racism by ideology as the key determinant of these policy preferences.
Discussion

THE ROLE OF RACISM
The first goal of this study was to provide a systematic test of the hypothesis that racial attitudes make the pivotal contribution to whites' opposition to race-targeted policies. The data seem to us quite clear: racial predispositions dominate all other factors in terms of individual correlations or regression coefficients, and in their capacity for explaining variance in policy preferences. Nonracial attitudes (such as political ideology, party identification, social welfare policy attitudes, and such traditional social values as individualism, morality, and authoritarianism) have been as thor-19. For racial affect, the average correlations for the high-and low-education groups are . 26 and .28, respectively; for stereotypes, .28 and .20; and .21 and -.08 for old-fashioned racism. 20. The average correlations for the nonracial values were .29 and .08 at the two educational levels. Because of the general weakness of nonracial values in the regression equations and to conserve space, their results are not shown in table 8. In brief, however, only authoritarianism has a significant effect among the highly educated, and that, in only one case. For none of the values are there strong or consistent differences between educational groups.
oughly controlled for as possible, and they do not have strong effects; they are overshadowed by the effects of racism.21
Further evidence of the generality of a racially based response is the considerable commonality in whites' responses to these different racial policy areas. We have not attempted a systematic assessment of possible differences in level of white support across areas. But by two other criteria we find some striking similarities of response. The underlying structure of racial policy attitudes fits either a simple single-factor model or a multiplefactor model with highly correlated factors. This complements other findings that racial policy attitudes tend to load on a single factor distinct from nonracial attitudes (Abramowitz 1994; Sears and Kosterman 1991) . Also, the determinants of policy preferences are quite similar across policy areas, even when measured in different surveys. These findings suggest that race is the dominant cue governing whites' responses to explicitly race-targeted policies, although other features of the policies clearly are visible as Racial attitudes also influence evaluations of black and ethnocentric white candidates but do not have a clear independent influence on evaluations of the major-party presidential candidates. Finally, racial attitudes dominate racial policy preferences even among college graduates, contrary to the view that college education damps their effects.
These findings are quite consistent with the symbolic politics notion with which we began. Most of the racial and nonracial predictors had significant bivariate correlations with all our dependent variables. But when all factors were considered simultaneously, racial attitudes dominated preferences regarding racial policy (as well as of the black candidate, Jesse Jackson, and the ethnocentric white candidate, Pat Buchanan). Presumably, the explicit racial content of these attitude objects evoked racial predispositions. The mainstream white candidates, in contrast, seem to have evoked primarily nonracial predispositions. Moreover, higher education (as with higher information flows more generally) increased the constraint of all these predictor attitudes with policy and candidate evaluations-but did not influence the balance between racial and nonracial predictors.
This conclusion, that racism (in whatever form) is central to these political preferences, is contrary to that offered by some other researchers (e.g., Roth 1994; Sniderman and Piazza 1993) . The difference, we believe, lies in our more comprehensive and systematic examination of antecedent ra-21. Indeed, some might feel that we have overcontrolled for nonracial attitudes, since the partisan attitudes, at least, tend to be correlated with racial attitudes (see Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996) . However, we prefer this more conservative test of the effects of racism. 22. Other evidence indicates that racial attitudes have stronger effects regarding explicitly racial policies than regarding only implicitly racial ones such as welfare or crime (Abramowitz 1994; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Sears, Citrin, and van Laar 1995). cia1 attitudes, and our more thorough replication across policy areas and across surveys.
SYMBOLIC RACISM
Our second major goal was to test the hypothesis that symbolic racism is a considerably stronger political force in contemporary America than are other, more traditional indicators of racial prejudice. This case, too, we believe has been made quite strongly in our data. In bivariate correlations or in regression analyses, symbolic racism dominates, while stereotypes and old-fashioned racism have little residual effect.23 Nor does prowhite loyalty play a significant role in opposition to racial policies. Other researchers' reports in the published literature of weak effects of racial attitudes have arisen, we believe, because they have been looking in the wrong place for them. This is not to say that antiblack affect and traditional racial stereotypes (or even pockets of old-fashioned racism) no longer exist. But they no longer have the political strength that symbolic racism has.24
The hypothesis that symbolic racism is a different and politically more p o w e h l form of racism has attracted several critiques that need to be addressed. One is that symbolic racism may not be very different from older forms of prejudice such as stereotypes or old-fashioned racism (Fazio et al. 1995; Miller 1994; Raden 1994; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986; Weigel and Howes 1985) . Indeed, in our data they were correlated, but the consistently greater impact of symbolic racism compared with older forms of racial antagonism, across a number of different replications, would seem to indicate that it is a distinctive ~rientation.'~ Moreover, symbolic racism contributes substantial independent variance of its own to racial policy preferences in addition to mediating some of the effects of its putative antecedents (antiblack affect and conservative nonracial values and attitudes). But to test directly for its independence, we conducted unconstrained factor analyses (with oblique rotation) of all racial independent variables in each survey. In brief, in every survey all symbolic racism 23. Kinder and Sanders (1996) report roughly similar effects on racial policy preferences of antiblack stereotypes in the 1990 GSS and of "racial resentments" in the 1986 NES. However, they treat the comparison as somewhat speculative because it is made across two different surveys in two different years rather than within one, the two sets of racial attitude predictors are not compared in the same model, and the dependent variables are different in the two surveys. 24. And, though not a feature of this study, we have found elsewhere that symbolic racism acts less like general ethnocentrism than like a more specifically antiblack antagonism (Sears, Citrin, and van Laar 1995) . 25. The average correlation between symbolic racism and the other racial attitudes was .35; the correlations among the other racial attitudes averaged .28, as shown in table 5 (also see Miller 1994). items loaded on a factor separate from those on which the older forms of racial antagonism loaded.26
A second critique is that symbolic racism may not be internally very homogeneous (Colleau et al. 1990; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986) . However, the factor analyses of racial attitudes just described, yielding a distinctive factor for symbolic racism in each survey, along with the quite reasonable levels of scale reliability for symbolic racism cited earlier, averaging about .70, sustain the view that symbolic racism is a reasonably internally homogenous construct.
A third critique is that symbolic racism is "confounded'' with ideological conservatism and so does not cleanly assess the unique effects of racism. Ours would seem to be quite persuasive data against that view: controls on ideology do not weaken the effects of symbolic racism on policy references, and ideology itself has generally nonsignificant effects (tables 1-3); symbolic racism adds substantial unique explanatory variance even after ideology and all other nonracial attitudes have been considered (table 4); and ideology is not a strong determinant of symbolic racism (table 5) .
Fourth, others have suspected that symbolic racism might be just a minor variant of authoritarianism (Raden 1994; Weigel and Howes 1985) , or that it might have lesser effects than authoritarianism (Sniderman and Piazza 1993) . Again, our evidence would seem persuasive against both views. The raw correlations between the two are substantial (averaging .38; see table 5), but in the regression analyses authoritarianism is a modest contributor to either symbolic racism or racial policy preferences, having less effect than racial attitudes in each case. Authoritarianism and symbolic racism undoubtedly share some variance, but the explicitly racial character of symbolic racism is a critical distinction between them.
A fifth concern is that the impact of symbolic racism is just a result of conceptual overlap with our dependent variables. If symbolic racism merely measured opposition to special, race-conscious government aid to blacks in the abstract, and the racial policy scales, opposition to it in concrete form, any association between them might reflect nothing more than that common content. To begin with, it might be noted that abstract and concrete versions of sociopolitical attitudes are not invariably consistent 26. Specifically, the 1986 NES yielded two modestly correlated factors (phi = .25); all symbolic racism items loaded on the first factor, and all old-fashioned racism items, on the second, while the black thermometer failed to load on either (loadings < .30). The 1992 NES yielded three factors: all symbolic racism items loaded on one, all stereotypes on the second, and the black and white thermometers on the third (only the first and second factors were highly correlated, phi = .49). The 1994 GSS yielded two correlated factors (phi = .48); the symbolic racism items loaded on one, and the old-fashioned racism items on the second. And the 1995 LACSS yielded two correlated (.51) factors, the stereotypes loading on one and the symbolic racism items on the second (see McConahay 1986 for similar analyses).
with each other. Classic cases include the "principle-implementation" gap in racial attitudes (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985) , the gap in responses to abstract and concrete versions of civil liberties, or the common preference for both "smaller government" and increased spending on specific services (see, e.g., Sears and Citrin 1985) .
But we have more concrete evidence against this interpretation.
(1)The effects of symbolic racism are not confined to contemporary raceconscious policies of special treatment for blacks but occur just as consistently concerning the equal opportunity policies dating from the 1950s (compare table 1 with table 3 ). Any policy issues with manifest racial content seem to evoke symbolic racism. (2) Symbolic racism has consistently significant effects on evaluations of Jesse Jackson and Pat Buchanan, neither of whom, as an attitude object, presumably suffers from this conceptual overlap.27 (3) We have imposed substantial controls on ideology, party identification, and social welfare attitudes, which bear directly on the magnitude of government action but make no explicit reference to blacks. They consistently have weaker effects than does symbolic racism, whose effects are not substantially reduced by such controls. And (4) we earlier presented analyses purging the symbolic racism scales of any items alluding to government action and "special favors," which reduced their reliability and predictive power very little. "Content overlap" does not seem to account for much of the link between symbolic racism and racial policy preferences.
Conclusions
The strengths of our analyses lie in the consistency of the findings across different tests, we believe. The basic findings are replicated in four different surveys spanning nearly a decade, and on three different policy areas. The basic independent and dependent variables were all operationalized somewhat differently across the four studies, giving some further confidence in the generality of the findings. And the findings are remarkably parallel across all these variations. We have not tried to squeeze a great deal of subtlety from the data; our goal in this article has been to insure that the main findings are strong and replicable, and we have confidence that they are. Indeed, given the considerable replication of our core findings within this article, it seems likely that contrary reports based on single surveys may have overinterpreted possibly chance departures from the essential story.
27. Although the evaluation of any candidate obviously depends in part on issue proximities.
Finally, we should take note of four important questions that we have not attempted to resolve in this article. As Bobo (1988; also Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997) has correctly observed, we have not here or elsewhere attempted to analyze the forces that gave rise to the shift from old-fashioned to symbolic racism; that probably requires a different form of analysis altogether. Second, we have indicated that an additive model involving both antiblack affect and conservative nonracial attitudes and values explains the origins of symbolic racism moderately well. However, we have not traveled far down the road of unraveling exactly which nonracial dispositions are involved, nor do we test nonadditive models, and both issues deserve more thorough analysis (see Sears and Kosterman 1991; Wood 1994) . Third, we have not attempted to address in detail the numerous variants on a realistic group conflict model cited earlier. And, finally, there is work going forward on the assumption that indirect measures of prejudice will be more valid than the direct measures we have used (Banaji and Greenwald 1994; Fazio et al. 1995; Gaertner and Dovidio 1986) . Our findings seem fairly robust, however, despite whatever weaknesses the direct approach entails (and recent findings suggest indirect and direct measures may in fact be producing very similar results, after all; see Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park 1997) .
In conclusion, we hope that the strength of the findings here will lay to rest the notion that white opposition to racially targeted policies is primarily motivated by nonracial considerations, or that any racially based motivation is limited to a few poorly educated ethnocentrics or believers in white supremacy. Racism is considerably more widespread in American society than that, it cannot be reduced to the older forms of prejudice familiar in the pre-civil rights era, and it continues to have quite pervasive effects. It is not a pleasant aspect of our society, but it is not one that should be swept under the carpet, either.
